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ABSTRACT
The treatment of Internet traffic is increasingly affected by
national policies that require the ISPs in a country to adopt
common protocols or practices. Examples include govern-
ment enforced censorship, wiretapping, and protocol deploy-
ment mandates for IPv6 and DNSSEC. If an entire nation’s
worth of ISPs apply common policies to Internet traffic, the
global implications could be significant. For instance, how
many countries rely on China or Great Britain (known traf-
fic censors) to transit their traffic? These kinds of questions
are surprisingly difficult to answer, as they require combin-
ing information collected at the prefix, Autonomous System,
and country level, and grappling with incomplete knowledge
about the AS-level topology and routing policies. In this pa-
per we develop the first framework for country-level rout-
ing analysis, which allows us to answer questions about the
influence of each country on the flow of international traf-
fic. Our results show that some countries known for their
national policies, such as Iran and China, have relatively lit-
tle effect on interdomain routing, while three countries (the
United States, Great Britain, and Germany) are central to
international reachability, and their policies thus have huge
potential impact.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet routing is typically studied at the Autonomous
System (AS) level. This is by design. Traditionally,
ASes control their own internal networks and set their
own policies for the routing, filtering, and monitoring
of traffic, placing policy in the hands of the organiza-
tions that own them. Recently, groups of ASes have
begun to act under common policies, issued by their
country’s government. Examples include Internet cen-
sorship [1], wiretapping [2], and protocol-deployment
mandates [3, 4]. For instance, Chinese, British, and
Pakistani ISPs are required (or strongly encouraged) to
filter content deemed socially offensive. Although cen-
soring techniques differ, all three countries are known
to block traffic at the IP level (e.g., by filtering based on
IP addresses and URLs in the data packets, or perform-
ing internal prefix hijacks [5, 6, 7]), which could affect
the international traffic they transit. Some countries,
such as the United States and Sweden, wiretap interna-
tional traffic, where even encrypted traffic is vulnerable
to traffic-analysis attacks [8]. Finally, governments can
attempt to force the deployment of protocols, such as
the deployment of IPv6 and DNSSEC in federal agen-
cies of the United States.
It is unclear what effect any particular country’s poli-
cies have on the rest of the Internet. Typically, censor-
ship is applied to prevent domestic users from reach-
ing disagreeable content. However, some censorship
techniques (such as filtering based on IP addresses or
URLs) may affect all traffic traversing an AS. In ad-
dition, ASes might intentionally, or accidentally as in
the recent YouTube outage [6], apply censorship poli-
cies to international traffic. How many networks outside
of the country would be prevented from viewing Web
pages simply because their traffic traverses one of these
networks? Which international traffic is vulnerable to
warrantless wiretapping by the United States or Swe-
den? And, finally, how feasible is it to avoid directing
traffic through a given country with objectionable poli-
cies by using alternative routes?
To answer these questions, we must study the ag-
gregate effect of national policies on the flow of inter-
national traffic, rather than analyzing individual ASes
in isolation. In this paper we take initial steps toward
understanding interdomain routing at the nation-state
level. We are particularly interested in understanding
the influence that each country’s ASes have over reach-
ability between other countries. The resulting data and
measurement techniques could be useful to many com-
munities. First, those regions of the world with strong
dependencies on particular countries could use our re-
sult to guide changes in how they connect to the rest
of the Internet. Second, overlay networks (such as Re-
silient Overlay Networks [9]) could use our results to de-
termine how best to circumvent specific countries, help-
ing to ensure that data are delivered intact, and avoid
snooping. Third, our results would be helpful to policy
makers to understand what impact their decisions could
have on the global Internet.
There are two primary challenges in this work. The
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first is to define suitable metrics for quantifying the
importance, or centrality, of each country to Internet
reachability. The second is to accurately infer the data
needed to compute these metrics, and validate them.
We adapt the betweenness centrality metric from statis-
tical physics as a first approximation of country central-
ity. Betweenness centrality is typically used as a naive
traffic estimator at each node in a graph. We adapt be-
tweenness centrality to estimate the impact each coun-
try has on reachability between other countries, defining
country centrality (CC) in Section 4.
Our metrics take as input the country-level paths be-
tween each pair of IP addresses in the Internet. This is
a significant challenge because of the many levels of in-
ference required to produce a country-level interdomain
path. First, ASes select routes using the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP) [10], which chooses routes based
on undisclosed routing policies, rather than simply us-
ing the shortest path. Fortunately, this is a well-studied
problem and several inference algorithms exist for infer-
ring AS-level routes. A second challenge arises because
an individual AS may span many countries. This leads
us to consider routing at the IP prefix level, which re-
quires understanding how packets traverse each AS. Fi-
nally, each path must be converted to a country-level
path by mapping IP addresses to prefixes, and then
prefixes to countries (e.g., using routing registry data).
There is a risk of introducing significant, and possibly
compounding, error in each step of the process. How-
ever, we present empirical evidence to suggest that our
centrality metric is robust to the measurement noise,
and that our results are meaningful.
Our inference techniques allow us to estimate the cen-
trality of each country, where CC values range from 0
(implying no influence) to 1 (the theoretical maximum).
Our results show that countries known for censorship,
such as Great Britain, China, Australia, and Iran, have
CC values of 0.29, 0.07, 0.07, and 1.12e-05 respectively.
These results suggest that, of the countries that censor
Internet traffic, only some have significant impact on
global routing. In particular, the countries that have
received the most publicity for their censorship, such as
China, have significantly less impact on international
traffic than, say, Great Britain, which also censors traf-
fic. We also show that the United States and Sweden
(nations known to permit warrantless wiretapping) have
CC values of 0.74 and 0.02; even if ASes actively prefer
BGP routes that avoid the United States, the CC value
only drops from 0.74 to 0.55.
With national policies on the rise, we believe that
researchers, ISPs, and policy makers will soon need to
understand the impact that these policies can have on
other countries, networks, and even individual IP pre-
fixes. Our major contribution is the development of
a framework for studying interdomain routing at the
Figure 1: Example AS topology with AS paths.
Paths 1 and 2 both route between the same pair
of ASes (A and B), but their AS paths are dif-
ferent, depending on the destination prefix. The
same AS path can also have distinct country-
level paths, for example paths 1 and 3.
nation-state level. This includes identifying and ad-
dressing the many challenges of inferring the country-
level paths, developing network centrality metrics ap-
propriate for the problem, validating the methods, and
reporting initial results.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion we briefly discuss the Internet’s topology and the
correct granularity for measuring country paths. In Sec-
tion 3 we design, implement, and validate the Country
Path Algorithm (CPA) for inferring country-paths from
a pair of source and destination IP addresses. The algo-
rithm has several stages, as it must first infer the inter-
domain path, and then intradomain paths, and finally
determine the country path. Next, Section 4 reviews
betweenness centrality and presents two extensions for
measuring a country’s influence over global reachability.
These metrics take as input the global measurements
produced by the CPA. In Section 5, we apply our infer-
ence techniques to sample data sets of traceroutes and
AS paths, as well as inferred paths between all known
IP prefixes. This helps validate that our metrics are
robust to inference error. We also present initial results
characterizing the data produced by the CPA. Next,
we discuss future work and other possible challenges in
country level analysis in Section 6, we review related
work in Section 7, and finally conclude in Section 8.
2. AN APPROPRIATE GRANULARITY FOR
ANALYZING COUNTRY-LEVEL PATHS
The Internet is currently comprised of roughly 30,000
Autonomous Systems, which are typically independently
operated, multi-homed networks. Each AS is allocated
IP address space, which is a contiguous blocks of IP ad-
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dresses called IP prefixes. The interdomain routing pro-
tocol that allows ASes to reach one another’s prefixes
is called the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is
a policy based protocol that selects and propagates AS
paths according to local policies (e.g., economic rela-
tionships), rather than path performance (e.g., short-
est path routing). Example policies include customer-
provider in which the customer pays the provider for
transit, and peer-peer in which the participating ASes
transit each other’s customer traffic to their own cus-
tomers. Lixin Gao showed that these policies can affect
routing propagation [11]. For instance, most customers
would not be willing to provide transit from one of their
providers to another. Gao observed that ASes typically
follow the valley-free rule, which states that routes re-
ceived from a provider or peer should only be propa-
gated to customers.
For our experiments it is necessary to inference all
of the country-paths between each pair of IP addresses.
Since IP addresses are allocated to ASes, we could de-
termine the country-paths between each pair of ASes
and use that information to determine all paths between
each pair of IP addresses. One immediate problem is
that some ASes span more than a single country. A sec-
ond issue is that in many cases there are multiple paths
between two ASes, depending on where traffic enters
the AS and on the destination prefix in question. For
example, in Figure 1 AS A uses path 1 to reach prefix 1
at AS B, but uses path 2 to reach prefix 2 at the same
destination AS. AS B might split its traffic like this to
balance its traffic load between two providers (ASes C
and E).
A second possible approach would cluster together
the prefixes with the same AS paths between AS pairs,
and infer a path for one prefix from each cluster. This
is known as a BGP Atom [12, 13]. Although this
approach can enumerate the best AS-paths between
AS pairs, it does not encompass the full diversity of
country-level paths. Two destination prefixes with the
same AS path may have different underlying country-
level paths. For instance, in Figure 1 AS paths 1 and 3
are the same, however they terminate in different coun-
tries (United States in path 1 Australia in path 3).
After ruling out the first two approaches, we resorted
to inferring the country-level paths between each pair
of IP prefixes, the finest level of measurement available.
There are over 290,000 prefixes in today’s routers, re-
sulting in over 84 billion country paths that need to be
inferred and analyzed. We also study all of the available
alternate paths that exist from one prefix to another, re-
sulting in more than 465 billion country path inferences
that need to be performed. The large number of in-
ferences places significant constraints on the inference
algorithm’s complexity. For instance, simply running
Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm to determine the in-
traceroute =
C1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ipsrc, ip2, ip3,
C2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ip4, ip5, ip6,
C3︷︸︸︷
ipdst
traceroute = ipsrc, ip2︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS1
, ip3, ip4, ip5,︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS2
ip6, ipdst︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS3
Country-path Inference Algorithm:
(ipsrc, ipdst)→ (AS1, AS2, AS3)→ (C1, C2, C3)
Figure 2: Traceroutes, AS-paths, and country-
paths. A traceroute is the list of IP addresses
of the routers that a packet traverses from ipsrc
to ipdst. Each router belongs to an AS, and each
router is in a country C. The Country Path Al-
gorithm takes a source and destination IP ad-
dress as input, infers the interdomain AS-path
between the two addresses, and then infers the
country-path between them.
tradomain path of each AS in each path is too slow.
3. THE COUNTRY PATH ALGORITHM
The metrics described in Section 4 analyze country-
level paths to determine which countries can potentially
interfere with the communication of others. In this sec-
tion we present the Country Path Algorithm (CPA)
for inferring the country-level paths between any two
IP addresses. There are two steps to the procedure.
The first infers the interdomain path between the ad-
dresses, and the second step predicts the country-path
from the AS-path. We use a slightly modified version
of Qiu et al.’s [14] AS-path heuristic for the first step
which is described in 3.1, and introduce the first country
path predictor in the second step, presented in 3.3. An
overview of the CPA algorithm is shown in Figure 2.
The AS-path to country-path heuristic requires infor-
mation about known traceroutes and their correspond-
ing AS-paths and country-paths as input. We show how
to infer these paths from a traceroute in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Prefix Pair to AS-path
The first step in the country path algorithm is to map
prefix source/destination pairs to their appropriate AS
paths. Of the recent AS-path inference methods [14,
15, 16, 17], only Qiu’s provides prefix-level predictions
and is fast enough for our needs.
3.1.1 A Modified Version of Qiu’s Heuristic
Qiu’s heuristic simulates the propagation of BGP routes
across an AS topology, as if each AS had a single router.
The propagation model is a simplified model of the ac-
tual BGP protocol. In it, each router selects its best
path to the destination prefix after receiving a route
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1: KnownPath(p, G, prePaths):
2: while queue.length > 0 do
3: u ← POP(queue,0)
4: for all v ∈ peers(u) do
5: Pu ← ribIn(u)[p][0]
6: if legitimatePath((v)+Pu) then
7: tmppath ← ribIn(v)[p][0]
8: update ribIn(v)[p] ← with (v) + Pu
9: sort(ribIn(v)[p])
10: if tmppath = path(v)[p][0] and v ∈ queue then
11: append(queue,v)
12: return ribIn
Figure 3: Pseudo-code of Qiu’s inference algo-
rithm. Line 6 was modified to propagate paths
to pre-determined ASes.
1: ComparePath(P1 = (u, v1, ...), P2 = (u, v2, ...)):
2: if P1.ulen 6= P2.ulen then
3: return P1.ulen - P2.ulen
4: if |P1| 6= |P2| then
5: return |P1| − |P2|
6: if P1.freq 6= P2.freq then
7: return P2.freq - P2.freq
8: return P1 − P2
Figure 4: Pseudo-code of Qiu’s path compari-
son heuristic. Lines 2-4 have been switched with
lines 5-7 from the original algorithm.
announcement, and propagates the path to its neigh-
bors (obeying the valley-free rule) if its best path has
changed. The largest contribution that her work made
was to include known BGP paths from routing table
dumps (known as RIBs) to improve the accuracy of
the heuristic. Essentially, ASes are primed with known
paths for each prefix at the beginning of the algorithm.
Then, as the paths are propagated, paths that are the
fewest hops from a known path are given preference.
The original Qiu algorithm does not propagate paths
to ASes that have pre-determined paths, since they will
never select an alternate path. Therefore, many ASes
will only have a best path, and no selection of alterna-
tive paths available. Our centrality metrics require a
list of all possible alternate paths for each AS to each
prefix as well as the best path. This is needed to esti-
mate the ability of networks to route around (or avoid)
particular countries using alternate paths. Therefore,
we modified Qiu’s algorithm to propagate paths to all
ASes, even those that were primed with a known path.
Our changes to the original algorithm, are shown in
Figures 3 and 4. The purpose of our alterations is to
predict alternate paths, not to increase the algorithm’s
accuracy. In the validation section we show that our
changes appear to have no significant effect on the pre-
dictive accuracy of the algorithm.
3.1.2 Pre-processing the Data
Qiu’s algorithm takes as input a list of known BGP
routes and a topology of known ASes, the edges be-
tween ASes, and the economic relationship of each edge.
We retrieved the first RIB of 2009 (BGP routing table)
from RouteViews [18] and RIPE RIS servers [19]. In
total there are paths for 290,691 prefixes. We divided
the data in half, into a testing and training set. All
routes from each observation point are kept together,
and all observation points in the same AS are also kept
together.
The topology was extracted from the AS paths found
in the BGP RIBs. We developed a topology for use in
testing and the total set for use in our final experiments.
The training set topology has 29,580 vertices (ASes)
and 68,396 edges while the total set has 29,607 vertices
and 77,683 edges.
The edges of the topology must be labeled as one of
customer-provider, peer-peer, or sibling-sibling (two AS
numbers that represent the same network). We imple-
mented the relationship inference algorithm described
in [11] and labeled the edges of our topologies with
the results. In total, the testing topology has 6,616
peer-peer edges, 61,037 customer-provider edges, and
743 sibling-sibling edges. The total topology has 12,623
peer-peer edges, 64,050 customer-provider edges, and
1,010 sibling-sibling edges.
3.1.3 Validation
To ensure that our implementation of the heuristic
was working correctly, we downloaded RouteViews and
RIPE RIBS from the beginning of 2005, which is close
in time to the data used for Qiu et al.’s original paper.
We split the data into testing and training sets propor-
tional in size to the data sets used in [14] (we used the
RIPE data for training, and tested on the RouteViews
data), and then fed the testing topology and paths as
input to the heuristic for prediction of paths in the test-
ing set. The heuristic was able to predict 60% of the
testing paths, exactly as stated in the original paper.
This shows that the alterations had little effect on the
algorithm, and suggests that our implementation is cor-
rect.
On our 2009 data set, the algorithm is able to predict
the exact path found in the training set of the RIB
correctly 54% of the time. However, the exact path is
often in the routing table, but not selected as the best
path. We show that the exact path is in the routing
table 80% of the time.
Our results suggest that the routing table of each
AS is relatively accurate, however the best path is not
reliably selected. We return to this point in Section 4
and show experimentally that the heuristic is accurate
enough for the reachability analysis that we perform.
3.2 Mapping Traceroutes to AS and Country
Paths
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The next step is to map an AS-path into a country-
path. This requires information about known country-
level paths and their respective AS-paths. In this sub-
section we describe how we extract country-level and
AS-level paths from traceroutes, and the next section
shows how the data can be used for inference country-
level paths.
3.2.1 Challenges
Traceroutes show the router-level path between two
IP addresses. By converting the routers’ IP addresses to
countries, we can determine the countries that a packet
traverses.
There are many impediments to this process. First,
a router can mask its existence in traceroutes by not
decrementing packet TTLs, but we assume that this
is a rare practice. A router could also be configured
to not respond to traceroutes, which happens relatively
frequently. Such traceroutes are incomplete, but we can
still extract useful information from them.
The next challenge is to understand the location (coun-
try and AS) of each IP addresses found in the tracer-
outes. IP addresses are allocated to ASes by the re-
gional routing registries (ARIN, RIPE, AFRINIC, AP-
NIC, and LACNIC). Each regional registry publishes
a database of allocated IP space, the ASes they were
allocated, and the country of the organization. Once
allocated, it is up to the ASes to update the registry
databases of any changes. For instance, if an ISP del-
egates a portion of its prefix to a customer AS, that
customer should be registered for the particular sub-
prefix. This is not always done, and the registries are
known to be incomplete and often inaccurate [20, 21].
3.2.2 Algorithm and Data
We collected traceroutes from the iPlane project [22]
on December 17th of 2008. The data set contains roughly
26 million traceroutes, that were collected from 198 ob-
servation points (the majority of which are PlanetLab
[23] nodes), with an average of 133,580 traceroutes each.
To convert the traceroutes to country-paths, we first
had to obtain registry information for each IP address
in the traceroutes. Team Cymru [24] keeps track of reg-
istry allocated prefixes and associated country code and
AS mappings. For each IP in the traceroutes (as well
as each prefix in the RIBs), we queried Team Cymru’s
server to obtain the country code. In the case that the
lookup failed, or that the response was vague, such as
“EU” (Europe) or “AP” (Asia Pacific), we ran a nor-
mal whois request (version 4.7.27) and extracted coun-
try and AS information where possible (whois responses
vary, some contain more information than others). Our
only tweak to the data was to replace the Hong Kong
country code with China since they are now the same
country. In total, we were able to determine a specific
country code for 99% of the IPs found in traceroutes.
3.2.3 Validation
To verify the accuracy of our IP to country code and
AS lookups, we compared our results to known ASes
and countries for particular routers. One method of
extracting the actual location of a given router is to ex-
tract it from its DNS hostname. For instance, the router
with hostname, 143.ATM3-0.XR2.LAX2.ALTER.NET,
is located in Los Angeles, which is in the United States.
Two projects have developed hostname to location heuris-
tics, RocketFuel’s undns [25] and the sarangworld project
[26], and the iPlane project has applied them to the
routers in the traceroute data set. The locations were
further verified by the iPlane project by timing analysis
and known topology information.
For each IP address that was resolved to a country
and AS using undns and sarangworld (9% of IPs in the
traceroutes), we compared the values to our inferenced
data from routing registries. We found that we could
correctly infer the country of a router 96% of the time,
and the AS 92% of the time. Our verification suggests
that we have relatively accurate data sets with which
to build our AS Path to country-path heuristic.
3.3 AS-path to Country-path
The last piece of our IP address pair to country-path
algorithm involves inferring a country-path from an AS
path. In total, the final algorithm takes a pair of IP
addresses as input, determines their longest matching
prefixes (like a routing table lookup), finds the best in-
ferred AS path between them, and finally uses the al-
gorithm in this sub-section to infer the countries along
the path.
3.3.1 Challenges
It is difficult to infer intradomain routes. An Au-
tonomous System is so called because it has complete
control over its intradomain network. It can use what-
ever protocols it likes, even experimental ones, with
its own policies, to determine how packets traverse its
own network. This makes it very difficult for an out-
sider to determine how a packet might route through an
AS. We do know that common intradomain protocols
(e.g. OSPF [27] and IS-IS [28]) will typically choose the
shortest path between any two points in the network.
The difficulty is that the definition of shortest path can
change between networks. For some networks, a short
path might be low latency, where for others it might be
one that follows a high-bandwidth path.
Since we are provided with an inferred AS path, the
next step is to determine where the route will enter
(ingress router) and exit (egress router) each AS. A sim-
ply heuristic for finding the exit router might be to find
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ipsrc, ip2︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS1
, ip3, ip4, ip5,︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS2
ip6, ipdst︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS3
Figure 5: Example annotated traceroute. ipsrc,
ip3, and ip6 are AS ingress points, and ip2 and
ip5 are AS egress points.
1: predictCountries(AS-path):
2:
3: for each ASN in the AS-path do
4: if (a known ingress point exists for the next ASN from
this ingress) then
5: Select countries and next ingress point from known-
ingress
6: else if (a known ingress point exists for the next ASN
from this ASN in this country) then
7: Select most frequented ingress point (and corre-
sponding country path)
8: else if (a known ingress point exists for the next ASN
from this ASN) then
9: “”
10: else if (a known ingress point exists for the next ASN
from this country) then
11: “”
12: else if (a known ingress point exists for the next
ASN) then
13: “”
Figure 6: Pseudo-code of AS-path to country-
path prediction
the the nearest router to the ingress router that is con-
nected to the next hop AS. But again, nearness is not
well defined.
Finally, the algorithm has to be fast enough to infer
a country-path for 465 billion interdomain paths (one
inference for each pair of prefixes over each AS path
in each router’s RIB) in a reasonable amount of time.
Performing Dijkstra’s shortest path across large ASes
with tens of thousands of routers billions of times is
simply too slow, and most AS paths include at least
one AS of that size.
3.3.2 The Algorithm
We present a linear time (relative to the size of the
AS path) algorithm to inference country-paths from AS-
paths. The insight of the algorithm, similar to Qiu’s
AS-path algorithm, is to use known intradomain paths
as often as possible, rather than infer our own.
The algorithm is broken down into two phases, ini-
tialization, and path inference. In the initialization
phase, the (traceroute, country-path, AS-path) triples
of known data are parsed for two particular features.
First, each AS’s ingress point is stored, relative to the
ingress point of the previous AS in the path. For in-
stance, Figure 5 shows an example triple in which we
learn that when AS2 is entered at ip3, and AS3 is the
next AS, with ingress point ip6. Therefore, when AS
path AS2, AS3 is seen in the future, and AS2 was en-
tered at ip3, then we infer that ip6 is AS3’s ingress
point and will have the country-path inferred from ip
addresses ip3, ip4, ip5,and ip6. To increase accuracy, we
also look two ASes ahead to determine the next AS’s
ingress point. For instance, we learn that when AS1 is
entered at ipsrc and AS2 and AS3 are next, then ip3 is
the ingress point to AS2. We store this information in
a hash table referred to as the known-ingress table.
We will not have a value in the known-ingress ta-
ble for every combination of ASes and ingress points.
Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to to guess ingress
points for the next AS. To aid in our guesses, the ini-
tialization algorithm also keeps track of the frequency of
each AS’s ingress points. For instance, we might learn
that ip3 is the ingress point for AS2 75% of the time, or
50% of the time when coming from an AS in Canada,
or 90% of the time when coming from anywhere in AS1.
We keep track all of these frequencies, and their rela-
tionships to previous ASes and countries.
The prediction algorithm is shown in Figure 6. For
each AS in the AS path, it searches the known data for
the current context (e.g. next AS, current country, cur-
rent ingress point), progressively becoming less specific,
until a match is found. A match provides information
about the next ingress point and the list of countries
between the current and next ingress points. This pro-
ceeds until the final ingress point is found. At which
point, the country of the destination prefix is appended
to the country-path and the path is returned.
3.3.3 Validation
To validate our algorithm, we selected roughly 1.4
million complete traceroutes from the testing set in which
every router along the path has been determined the
country and AS are known for each router, and the
source and destination IP addresses are from different
countries. Then, we initialized the prediction algorithm
with the training set and predicted country paths for
the test routes. Our algorithm predicted the exact set
of countries 78% of the time. Another way of compar-
ing the agreement of the predicted results to the known
set of paths is to take the intersection of the sets over
the union Predicted∩ActualPredicted∪Actual , as seen in [17]. The agree-
ment between our predicted paths and the actual paths
is 92%, suggesting that when the predictor is wrong, it
is usually close.
4. REACHABILITY METRICS
There are many ways to quantify the importance (or
centrality) of a node in a network. Network central-
ity is a well studied problem [29, 30, 31] in statistical
physics that has recently been applied to the AS-level
Internet [32, 33, 34]. In this section we discuss the be-
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Figure 7: Betweenness centrality. The middle
node does not have the greatest degree, but it
is along the greatest number of shortest paths.
tweenness centrality metric, which is a centrality metric
that we adapt for our own experiments. From between-
ness centrality, we derive two metrics for measuring the
centrality of a country at the BGP level.
4.1 Background on Betweenness Centrality
The simplest centrality metrics measure the degree of
a node and the average shortest-path distance from a
node to any other in the network. More advanced met-
rics, such as betweenness centrality, directly incorporate
the importance of a node to network routing.
Betweenness centrality is an estimator of the impor-
tance of a node for communication flow in a network.
It assumes that traffic flows equally along the shortest
paths between two points, that each node has unit traf-
fic, and that each node’s traffic is uniformly distributed
to the other nodes. It then estimates how much traffic
flows through each node with the following formula:
Betweenness(υ) =
∑
s 6=υ 6=t∈V
s 6=t
σs,t(υ)
σs,t
where σs,t is the number of shortest paths between s
and t and σs,t(υ) is the number of shortest paths be-
tween s and t that transit through υ. Nodes that transit
lots of traffic have higher betweenness values than those
that transit little. Figure 7 depicts an example network
in which the middle node has the highest betweenness,
even though four nodes have greater degree.
If each pair of nodes in the network had a single short-
est path between them, then the betweenness centrality
of a node could be interpreted as the number of shortest
paths that pass through the node. In a network like the
Internet, there are typically many shortest paths be-
tween two nodes. When multiple shortest paths exist,
betweenness centrality splits the traffic equally among
the shortest paths (by dividing it by σs,t). A node’s be-
tweenness centrality then represents the total amount
of traffic it transits, given the stated assumptions.
4.2 Country Centrality
In this study, we are interested in determining each
country’s influence over global reachability. This is not
the same as determining how much traffic a country
transits. Although a country might transit 50% of all
Internet traffic, that does not necessarily imply that
50% of country-pairs rely upon that country to com-
municate with one another. But, traffic estimates can
still be useful for determining influence over reachabil-
ity.
Because we are concerned with global reachability,
we assume that all countries are equally important, and
wish to communicate with one another uniformly. We
then want to determine how much influence each coun-
try has over the communication paths. This can be
thought of as a traffic estimation problem in which all
countries have unit traffic, and all countries split that
traffic equally to each destination. Then, to determine
influence, we measure how much traffic each node tran-
sits. This is similar to the problem that betweenness
centrality tries to solve.
There are three significant differences between coun-
try centrality and betweenness centrality. The first is
that in country centrality, network nodes are countries,
and each country is comprised of many prefixes. There-
fore, the paths between any two nodes in our graph
is actually the collection of paths between each pair
of prefixes between the source and destination coun-
tries. Second, the path between a pair of prefixes is not
the shortest path, but instead the country level path of
the best AS-path inferred using the techniques found
in Section 3. The final difference is that prefixes can
be of varying size. A prefix 12.0.0.0/8 has 224 IP ad-
dresses while 192.168.0.0/16 has 216 IP addresses. Since
we assume that each country has unit traffic, we then
assume that each prefix in a country sends and receives
traffic proportional to its fraction of the country’s total
IP address space.
We address the above differences with the Country
Centrality metric. We changed the σ function to work
on the best inferred path between prefixes instead of
shortest path between vertices. We also changed the
betweenness algorithm to sum over all of the prefixes
for each country, and weight each path according to
its prefix size. The CC value of a country υ can be
determined with the following formula:
CC(υ) =
∑
s 6=υ 6=t∈V
s 6=t
∑
ρs∈Ps
ρt∈Pt
(WρsWρt)σρs,ρt(υ)
where υ is a country, Ps is the set of prefixes for coun-
try s, and Wρs is equal to ρs ’s fraction of country s’s
prefix space |ρs|P
pi∈Ps |ρi|
. Here, the function σρs,ρt(υ)
equals the number of best paths between ρs and ρt that
transit country Since there is only one best country path
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between each pair of prefixes in this function, σ is ei-
ther 1 or 0. If each country had a single prefix, then the
CC value of υ would be the number of shortest paths
that transit υ, which represents the number of country-
pairs that transit υ to communicate. Since countries
have many prefixes, and traffic between prefixes is pro-
portional to prefix size, a country’s CC value represents
the total amount of traffic that it transits, given the
stated assumptions.
To simplify CC values, we present them in this paper
as normalized values from [0, 1] by dividing it by the
sum of traffic (with end-points other than the country
itself) that it does not transit. Therefore, a value of
one is the theoretical maximum value, suggesting that
the country transits all traffic for every country pair.
Similarly, a value of zero suggests that the country has
no influence on reachability.
4.3 Strong CC
The CC metric estimates reachability influence based
upon the best path between each pair of prefixes. BGP
routers typically have multiple available routes to select
from for each destination. Therefore, it is possible that
a country in the best path could be avoided by using an
alternate path. A network operator might intentionally
try to avoid routing through a particular country, be-
cause it is known to filter or wiretap their data. In this
subsection, we try to understand how central countries
are when alternative routes are considered.
We consider a country to be strongly between a source
and destination prefix if all of the source’s available
paths include the country. Once a router selects an al-
ternate path, that change is propagated throughout the
network, potentially changing the tables of thousands
of other routers. Rather than attempt to measure all of
the possible network states when alternate routes are se-
lected, we look at a snapshot of the network’s state, and
determine how hard it is to avoid a country given each
router’s currently available paths. The resulting mea-
sure is called the strong country centrality SCC (SCC)
metric.
SCC(υ) =
∑
s 6=υ 6=t∈V
s 6=t
∑
ρs∈Ps
ρt∈Pt
(WρsWρt) τρs,ρt(υ)
In the SCC measure, τρs,ρt(υ) is 1 (strongly central)
when all all available paths from from ρs to ρt include
υ, otherwise it is 0. Once normalized, a value of one
suggests that a country is completely unavoidable for
all paths of all country-pairs. A SCC value should be
strictly less than or equal to the same country’s CC.
5. COUNTRY CENTRALITY RESULTS
In this section we quantify the influence that coun-
tries have on Internet reachability. We begin by deter-
TR BGP
United States 0.335762 (1) 0.349493 (1)
Great Britain 0.240520 (2) 0.187967 (2)
Germany 0.149530 (3) 0.165787 (3)
Netherlands 0.079117 (4) 0.070454 (4)
France 0.059566 (5) 0.061420 (5)
Sweden 0.049587 (6) 0.013672 (15)
Hungary 0.042618 (7) 0.036281 (7)
China 0.033759 (8) 0.045443 (6)
Canada 0.033422 (9) 0.034070 (8)
Italy 0.032357 (10) 0.025297 (10)
Japan 0.024164 (11) 0.016592 (14)
Denmark 0.022172 (12) 0.165787 (21)
Russia 0.019994 (13) 0.023872 (11)
Singapore 0.017008 (14) 0.032938 (9)
Spain 0.016551 (15) 0.013413 (16)
Austria 0.016277 (16) 0.011704 (17)
South Africa 0.014977 (17) 0.002211 (20)
Australia 0.010235 (18) 0.007424 (12)
Serbia 0.007689 (19) 0.007488 (19)
Norway 0.006837 (20) 0.006769 (22)
Table 1: Country Centrality (CC) computed di-
rectly from traceroute (TR) and BGP paths
mining country centrality (CC) values from the incom-
plete view we have from the raw traceroute and BGP
paths described in Section 3. Then, we test our algo-
rithm for mapping prefix pairs to country-paths by us-
ing the same prefixes seen in the traceroute set, but with
the inferred country-paths that provide a more complete
view of the Internet topology. This experiment shows
that our metrics are robust to the error introduced in
the paths. Finally, we infer country-paths between all
pairs of prefixes and report on the CC and SCC values
for the highest-ranked countries and countries known
for pervasive censorship.
5.1 Analysis on Directly-Observed Paths
To start our analysis, we focus on statistics computed
directly from the paths observed in the raw traceroute
and BGP data. On the plus side, these paths are di-
rectly observed by some source, reducing the possibility
of inference errors. On the negative side, these data sets
provide only a partial (and potentially biased) view of
paths through the Internet, depending on the locations
of iPlane monitors (mostly PlanetLab nodes) and the
vantage points where publicly-available BGP feeds are
collected. In addition, these raw data sets do not pro-
vide information about alternate paths, precluding us
from computing the Strong CC (SCC) metric.
Computing the CC value of the traceroute data set
was straight-forward—we simply converted the tracer-
outes into country-paths using the method described
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in Section 3.2, and fed those paths into the algorithm
for computing the CC metric. The results for the top
20 countries are listed in the “TR” column of Table 1.
Similarly, for the BGP data, we inferred country-paths
for each of the AS paths in the routing-table dumps
described in Section 3. These results are listed in the
“BGP” column of Table 1. (Notice that the sum of
the CC values can be greater than one since multi-
ple countries can lie on the same path.) The top five
countries are the same in both data sets; the remaining
15 countries in the table are mostly the same, though
slightly rearranged as one might expect given the rela-
tively small differences in values across these countries.
The results show that three countries—the United
States, Great Britain, and Germany—have very high
CC values, while many of the commonly mentioned
countries that employ censorship (e.g., China and Iran)
have relatively little influence over global reachability.
European countries are heavily represented in the table,
including some countries with higher rankings than we
expected—such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Hun-
gary. We suspect that the relatively large number of
(small) countries in Europe cause a large number of
European countries to rely on other countries in the
same region for connectivity to the rest of the Internet.
In addition, these results may be, at least in part, an
artifact of the incomplete perspective of the raw tracer-
oute and BGP data; as seen in the next section, these
three countries drop somewhat (though admittedly not
dramatically) in the ranking when we use the more com-
plete, inferred paths.
5.2 Validation of Inference of Country Paths
The CC results from the raw traceroute and BGP
data, while interesting, represent only a tiny sample of
the Internet’s country-paths. Still, these data sets are
useful for validating our country-path inference tech-
nique. The validation experiment compares the CC
results of real country-paths (directly mapped IP ad-
dresses to countries) to inferred country-paths (country-
paths inferred from only the source and destination IP
addresses). The inference algorithm was trained on the
training sets of traceroutes and BGP RIBs. Then, we
used the primed country-path inference algorithm to
infer paths between the (source,destination) IP address
pairs in the testing traceroute set. It is possible that the
testing traceroute may have a source IP from an AS in
the RIB training set. The algorithm would then have a
known AS-path to inference, which would invalidate the
experiment. To prevent such overlap from affecting our
results, we ignored such traceroutes in the experiment.
We plot the results of the inferred paths against what
are believed to be accurately inferred “real” country-
paths in Figure 8. Both axis are log scaled to show the
countries with low centrality in greater detail. Ideally,
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Figure 8: Actual versus Predicted Country Cen-
trality. Predicted Country Centrality (CC) (log-
scaled y-axis) is plotted against the actual CC
for the same countries (log-scaled x-axis). Be-
cause there are so many small values, the data
is fit in log(y) vs log(x) space to prevent overfit-
ting the large values. The least squares linear fit
is a solid line and the ideal x = y line is dashed.
the data points would reside along the dotted x = y
line, suggesting that the CC of the real paths and in-
ferred paths are the same. Many of them, especially the
larger values, do lie closely along that line. Only a few
extreme outliers exist, and they have relatively low CC
values. We produced a least squares linear fit of log(x)
vs log(y). It is plotted as a solid line, and has slope 0.94,
with an R2 of 0.84. This experiment leads us to believe
that while there is inference error, the CC measurement
is robust enough to the noise that the resulting values
are meaningful.
5.3 Analysis on More Complete Country Paths
Because our inferred results match the CC values of
the real paths so well, we inferred the entire set of coun-
try paths between all 290,682 routable prefixes found
in our collection of RIBs. The country-path inference
algorithm was trained on the full traceroute and RIB
data sets. In total, the entire computation took two
days to run when spread over 14 processors. Figure 9
plots the CC values of all countries, sorted by their CC
values. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of countries
have very small CC values. We list the top 20 countries
in the ranking in the “CC” column in Table 2. The list
of countries has a significant overlap with Table 1. The
top five countries are the same, with just France (#4)
and the Netherlands (#5) swapped in ranking between
the two lists.
Surprisingly, the U.S. has a significantly higher CC
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Figure 9: Country Centrality (CC) on more
complete, inferred country-paths. Countries are
displayed on the x-axis, sorted by their CC val-
ues, and CC values are displayed on the y-axis.
CC SCC
United States 0.740695 (1) 0.546789 (1)
Great Britain 0.294532 (2) 0.174171 (2)
Germany 0.250166 (3) 0.124409 (3)
France 0.139579 (4) 0.071325 (4)
Netherlands 0.128784 (5) 0.051139 (5)
Canada 0.104595 (6) 0.045357 (6)
Japan 0.072961 (7) 0.027095 (11)
China 0.069947 (8) 0.030595 (10)
Australia 0.066219 (9) 0.037885 (8)
Hungary 0.064767 (10) 0.023094 (14)
Singapore 0.063522 (11) 0.043445 (7)
Italy 0.047068 (12) 0.027088 (12)
Spain 0.043248 (13) 0.025370 (13)
Russia 0.043228 (14) 0.035191 (9)
Austria 0.024632 (15) 0.010501 (17)
Sweden 0.023350 (16) 0.009785 (19)
South Africa 0.019294 (17) 0.013778 (15)
Denmark 0.015684 (18) 0.008101 (21)
Serbia 0.014935 (19) 0.012312 (16)
Switzerland 0.013302 (20) 0.003865 (35)
Table 2: Country Centrality (CC) and Strong
Country Centrality (SCC) computed using in-
ferred country paths
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Figure 10: Strong CC (Zoomed). The top 10
countries (in terms of CC value) are displayed on
the x-axis, sorted by their CC values. The CC
values are displayed on the y-axis. The squares
represent the Strong CC values of each respec-
tive country and have the same scale as the CC
data.
value in Table 2—nearly double the CC value in Table 1.
We suspect that this is caused by the sampling bias in
the traceroute and BGP data sets. For instance, the
incomplete data sets likely over sample the routes from
countries that have well-distributed connections to the
Internet (such as European countries) and under sam-
ple countries with less rich connectivity (such as those in
South America) that often rely on the United States for
reachability to the rest of the Internet. This disparity
points out the importance of having a more complete
view of country-paths—possible because of the infer-
ence algorithms we used to compute paths from vantage
points that do not run iPlane monitors or provide BGP
measurement feeds.
Next, we investigate the Strong CC (SCC) of each
country. This is an estimate of the difficulty in cir-
cumventing a given country, even if alternate routes are
used. The results are shown in the “SCC” column of
Table 2. The table shows that the top three countries
have high SCC values, suggesting that they are hard to
avoid even using alternate paths. We also show the top
10 CC and SCC countries in Figure 10. Not surpris-
ingly, the U.S. is especially difficult to avoid, especially
for countries (e.g., in South America) that connect di-
rectly to the U.S. for connectivity to the Internet.
Finally, we consider the countries that are known for
significant censorship. When Internet censorship is dis-
cussed, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are
commonly mentioned as countries that filter Internet
traffic. According to the OpenNet Initiative [35], these
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CC SCC
China 0.069947 (8) 0.030595 (10)
Vietnam 0.007087 (30) 0.003916 (34)
South Korea 0.003548 (44) 0.001044 (54)
Saudi Arabia 0.003286 (47) 0.001722 (49)
U.A.E. 0.000839 (65) 0.000541 (63)
Pakistan 0.000274 (81) 0.000265 (74)
Iran 1.12e-05 (105) 9.48e-06 (101)
Yemen 1.06e-07 (131) 7.50e-08 (130)
Oman 2.64e-08 (138) 2.64e-08 (133)
Myanmar 0 0
North Korea 0 0
Sudan 0 0
Syria 0 0
Table 3: CC and SCC values of countries with
pervasive censorship. Countries with 0 values
were not found to transit any international traf-
fic.
four countries along with eight others partake in per-
vasive traffic filtering. The CC values of each of these
countries is shown in Table 3. Aside from China (with
a CC of 0.07), these countries appear to have very lit-
tle influence over global reachability. We were initially
surprised to see that South Korea has a relatively low
CC value (0.004), given the significant penetration of
the Internet in the country. However, the large deploy-
ments of broadband connectivity for end users need not
relate to whether Korean ISPs play an important role
in transit service for other countries.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
There are several potential sources of bias in the data
sets we used, which could potentially impact the results.
First, it is believed that the Internet’s topology is
significantly larger than what can be observed in BGP
RIBs [36]. For example, peer-peer connections are only
visible to customers of the peers (due to the valley-
free rule) and are thus difficult to find [37]. Fortu-
nately, it is believed that customer-provider edges are
well represented in the observed RIBs. The topologies
that we extracted from the RIBs support these suppo-
sitions. As shown in 3.1, the number of peer-peer edges
increases by 90% between the testing set and the to-
tal set while customer-provider edges only increased by
5%. Peer-peer edges typically have less impact on rout-
ing than customer-provider edges, since only the down-
stream customers of the two peers can route through
peer-peer edges. In addition, we suspect that peer-peer
edges, for the most part, arise between ASes in the same
country, or at least the same small geographic region
(e.g., between two countries in Europe), which would
also limit their influence on the international flow of
traffic through the Internet. Still, the missing edges
could have impact on the results of our measurements.
To test this, we plan to run our algorithms on multi-
ple inferred and generated [38, 39] topologies, including
traceroute measurements collected from larger number
of vantage points [40].
Beyond the question of bias, we would also like to
study the evolution of country centrality over time. It
has been suggested that the United States transits a
smaller fraction of total traffic than in the past. It would
be interesting to know if the United States has also be-
come less central in terms of reachability, and if so why.
Which countries are becoming more central over time
and which less so? It would also be interesting to know
how our results would change if we incorporated more
realistic models of interdomain traffic [41]. A more long-
term question involves understanding the economically-
driven strategies that single countries or small groups
of countries could adopt, either to enhance their own
centrality or to reduce the centrality of other countries
(e.g., such as overlay routing). There may also be other
network measures that are of interest. Deletion impact
or measures that incorporate some component of traffic
are two obvious directions.
Finally, the paths traversed by domestic traffic would
also be interesting to study. What fraction of domestic
paths (those that have a source and destination within
the same country) are actually routed through another
country? Answering this question would provide in-
sight into the influence that foreign nations have over a
country’s domestic routing and security, and would shed
light on a question posed in [2] concerning whether war-
rantless wiretapping on links connecting one country to
another might inadvertently capture some purely do-
mestic traffic. The framework developed in this paper
could be extended to address that question.
7. RELATED WORK
We are unaware of previous work measuring the im-
pact individual countries have on the flow of interna-
tional traffic in the Internet. However, our results rely
on earlier work on network centrality, Internet topology
measurement, AS-relationship inferencing, AS-path in-
ferencing, and studies of Internet censorship. In this
section we briefly review the projects most relevant to
this paper.
In addition to Qiu et al.’s work [14] discussed ear-
lier, there are at least two other methods for infer-
ring AS-paths that are prefix specific. Mu¨hlbauer et
al. [16] showed that when an AS has multiple routers
distributed across many locations, more than one router
needs to be simulated to capture all of the routing di-
versity within the AS. By simulating multiple quasi-
routers per AS, they were able to predict AS-paths with
relatively high accuracy (reported 65%); however, the
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high overlap between their testing and training data sets
makes it difficult to compare the accuracy of their tech-
nique with ours. and more computationally efficient.
This allowed us to study all 290,000 prefixes rather than
the 1000 prefixes reported in Mu¨hlbauer et al.
Another AS-path inference algorithm was developed
by Madhyastha et al., [17] who used a structural ap-
proach to AS-path prediction. They began with known
traceroutes from the iPlane project and used them to
infer IP-level paths for chosen src/dest pairs. The al-
gorithm works by searching for the closest observation
point to the source prefix (by examining a few sample
traceroutes from the source) and then uses the known
iPlane paths to infer the remaining paths from the source.
They do not report the accuracy of the IP-level paths,
but we are interested in investigating this technique in
future work as an alternate way to infer country paths.
Finally, there has been an enormous amount of work
developing statistical measures of network properties [29,
30, 31], including preferential attachment models [42]
and many models of the AS network [43, 39, 38, 44,
45]. Some of this work measures node centrality by
the impact it would have on network connectivity if the
AS was deleted, known as deletion impact [46, 39]. A
parallel can potentially be made between node deletion
and censorship. For example, deleting a country from
the network is conceptually similar to all other ASes
collectively routing around that country.
8. CONCLUSIONS
As government control over the treatment of Internet
traffic becomes more common, many people will want
to understand how international reachability depends
on individual countries and to adopt strategies either
for enhancing or weakening the dependence on some
countries. The work presented in this paper is an initial
step towards providing the algorithms and tools that
will be needed to understand and manage nation-state
routing.
In particular, we discussed the problems associated
with understanding routing patterns at the country level,
which is the level at which most censorship and wire-
tapping policies are mandated. We then described al-
gorithms and data sources to infer country-level paths
from traceroute probes and AS-level BGP data, and we
validated those algorithms against different samples of
the same kinds of data. Next we discussed metrics for
comparing the relative importance of different countries
in current routing topologies. Finally, we used the al-
gorithms to infer a country path between each pair of
IPv4 prefixes and then applied the metrics to the paths
to obtain initial results.
It is not surprising that the results show the domi-
nance of the U.S. at the country routing level. However,
other countries appear to have either more or less im-
portance than one might expect. For example, both
Great Britain and Germany are second only to the U.S.
in centrality, while Japan, China, and India are only
8th, 10th, and 32nd respectively. Collectively, these re-
sults show that the “West” continues to exercise dispro-
portionate influence over international routing, despite
the penetration of the Internet to almost every region
of the world, and the rapid development of China and
India. Beyond what the results tell us about the In-
ternet today, we see the methods described in this pa-
per as helping network designers, policy makers, and
researchers better understand the likely impact of na-
tional policies on user privacy and the access to politi-
cally or socially sensitive content.
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